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The Informational Contribution of Social and Environmental Disclosures for Investors 
 
Corporations increasingly define their social and environmental initiatives and activities as part of their 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Disclosure practices have followed suit as well with social and 
environmental information typically being combined, often through a CSR report. The emergence of CSR 
is a response to the demands of activist investors, ethical and green institutional investors as well as rating 
services (e.g., Jantzi) which evaluate corporations through the lens of CSR, thus going beyond traditional 
environmental indicators. However, is this trend beneficial to investors? We investigate whether social 
disclosure and environmental disclosure substitute or complement each other in reducing information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, taking into account a firm‟s environmental performance and 
governance attributes. Our findings suggest that social disclosure and environmental disclosure substitute 
each other in reducing stock market asymmetry, as proxied by share price volatility. Our results also show 
that the reduction in share price volatility is higher for economic (hard) environmental disclosure than for 
generic (soft) environmental disclosure. Hence, future research in CSR disclosure may fruitfully 
distinguish between social and environmental disclosures as well as between hard (economic-based) and 
soft environmental information.  
 
Key words: Environmental disclosure, governance attributes, information asymmetry, social disclosure. 
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The Informational Contribution of Social and Environmental Disclosures for Investors  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many investors and other financial market participants are increasingly being attracted to 
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI, otherwise known as ethical or sustainable investing) 
(Renneboog, Horst and Zhang, 2008). For instance, the Social Investment Forum (2010) reports 
that more than 10% of assets under management in the United States (close to $3 trillion out of 
$25 trillion) are now invested under SRI criteria. In light of investors‟ needs for guidance and 
reliable benchmarks to orient their investment strategy, several indices have emerged such as the 
Jantzi Social Index (Canada), Dow Jones World and Dow Jones STOXX Sustainability Indexes 
(United States, Europe, international). The construction of these indices relies on Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) indicators from various information sources, either external or 
internal (Ziegler and Schroder, 2009). Among these sources, a firm`s CSR own internal 
disclosure: for example, the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices reflect both environmental and 
social reporting.     
However, most voluntary disclosure guidelines (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative or GRI) 
as well as most prior research view corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure as an 
additive process where more is better (e.g., Ingram, 1978; Patten, 1991).  In other words, it is 
assumed that more social and environmental disclosure benefits the disclosing firm as well as its 
shareholders. There is anecdotal and empirical evidence that, on their own, both social disclosure 
(e.g. Downing, 1997; Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan, 2009; Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux and Magnan, 
2009) and environmental disclosure (e.g. Cormier, Magnan and Morard, 1993; Barth and 
McNichols, 1994; Li and McConomy, 1999; Aerts, Cormier and Magnan, 2008) convey value-
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relevant information to investors.  However, such evidence is not conducive to the development 
of efficient disclosure practices since it is likely that there is much overlap in the strategies 
underlying a firm‟s social and environmental actions and performance. Moreover, despite the 
growth and development of CSR disclosure by many organisations, it is still relatively unknown 
as to how investors interpret social and environmental disclosures together. Moreover, it is still 
uncertain as to how investors integrate a firm`s CSR performance into their assessment of CSR 
disclosure.  
In this study, we investigate whether social disclosure and environmental disclosure 
substitute or complement each other in reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
investors, taking into account a firm‟s environmental performance and governance attributes. 
Our study focuses on a sample of large Canadian firms. Share price volatility is the measure of 
information asymmetry. Our study builds upon the intuition of Neu, Warsame and Pedwell 
(1998) who offer a tentative template to analyze CSR by treating social disclosure as a 
determinant of environmental disclosure. They argue that social disclosure helps investors to 
frame the interpretation of environmental disclosures.  
Our results suggest that social disclosure and environmental disclosure substitute each 
other in reducing stock market asymmetry. This result suggests that future research in CSR 
disclosure may fruitfully distinguish between social and environmental disclosure. Our findings 
also show that the reduction in share price volatility is higher for hard environmental disclosure 
than for soft environmental disclosure. As expected, we observe that objective measures of 
environmental performance are negatively associated with environmental and social disclosure. 
Our results also show that environmental news exposure and firm size are key drivers of CSR 
disclosure.  
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We contribute to the literature on the determinants of information asymmetry between 
managers and investors. First, we show that voluntary social-related CSR disclosure reinforces 
the information value of environmental disclosure, even substituting or compensating for it under 
certain conditions. In that sense, we extend prior findings that social disclosure (e.g. Cormier, 
Ledoux and Magnan, 2009) and environmental disclosures (e.g. Barth and McNichols, 1994; 
Aerts, Cormier and Magnan, 2008) do influence capital market participants.  
We also document that a firm‟s governance influences the extent of its CSR disclosure 
and, ultimately, affects information asymmetry between managers and investors. These findings 
are consistent with those reported by Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2003) for the 
determination of financial reporting. In this sense, by showing that CSR disclosure is an 
extension of a firm`s governance, our findings are consistent with Jackson and Apostolakou‟s  
(2009) argument that voluntary CSR practices substitute for stakeholder participation while 
preserving owners‟ influence.   
Our study also provides some insights for managers wishing to enhance the efficiency of 
the message that they convey to investors and other stakeholders. Currently, there is much 
emphasis on just increasing the number of disclosed information items, without much 
consideration as to their incremental or substitute effect on investors‟ decision-making. For 
example, the GRI reporting framework is gaining recognition around the world but its scope is 
continuously being revised and augmented. However, such disclosures are not cost-free for 
organizations. Furthermore, investors must gauge, assess and retain an increasing flow of 
information: a more efficient disclosure strategy becomes critical if firms want investors to get 
the right picture of their CSR performance. In that regard, to the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to investigate the joint effect of social and environmental disclosure on 
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information asymmetry between managers and investors, taking into account environmental 
performance and governance attributes. Moreover, our findings are consistent with Lenzen, Dey 
and Murray‟s (2004) call for more careful measurement of CSR reporting. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a theoretical 
background. The study‟s methodology is described in section 3. Results are presented in section 
4. Finally, section 5 provides a discussion of the potential implication of the results. 
 
2. Environmental and Social Disclosures: Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) can be broadly understood as the way firms 
integrate social, environmental and economic concerns into their values, culture, decision 
making, strategy and operations. CSR is an evolving concept and its underlying construct has 
changed over time (Carroll, 1999). Such integration must be accomplished in a transparent and 
accountable manner, thereby leading to the implementation of better practices within the firm, 
creating wealth and improving society (Industry Canada, 2006). The World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development describes CSR as the business contribution to sustainable economic 
development. Beyond complying with legislation and regulations, CSR typically includes 
commitments and actions related to (not an all-inclusive list):  
 corporate governance and ethics;  
 health and safety;  
 environmental stewardship;  
 human rights (including core labour rights);  
6  
 human resource management;  
 community involvement, development and investment;  
 involvement of and respect for Aboriginal peoples;  
 corporate philanthropy and employee volunteering;  
 anti-bribery and anti-corruption measures;  
 accountability, transparency and performance reporting;  
 supplier relations, for both domestic and international supply 
chains.  
These elements of CSR are frequently interconnected and interdependent, and apply to 
firms wherever they operate. CSR has recently emerged as a critical concern for management. 
Integrating its actions within a clear CSR strategy helps organizations position themselves to 
proactively manage risks and take advantage of opportunities, especially with respect to their 
corporate reputation and broad engagement of stakeholders. The latter can include shareholders, 
employees, customers, communities, suppliers, governments, non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations and other organizations affected by a company's activities.   
 
2.2 Corporate Social Responsibility and Capital Markets 
Ultimately, CSR is about performance, i.e., moving beyond words on a page to effective 
and observable actions and societal impacts. In that regard, there is extensive evidence that CSR 
efforts often translate into improvements in a firm‟s financial performance (see, among others, 
McWilliams et al., 2006; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Roman et al., 1999; Griffin and Mahon, 
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1997; Pava and Krausz, 1995; Wood and Jones, 1995; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Richardson and 
Welker, 2001; Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan, 2009). 
However, the impact of a firm‟s CSR actions or initiatives can be analyzed more 
precisely by dividing them into two broad categories: social-related and environmental-related 
actions and initiatives. Social-related CSR emerges from relationships between an organisation 
and its employees, business partners and other stakeholders, and provides opportunities to create 
value (Burt, 1992). In that regard, Adler and Kwon (2002) note that social-related CSR facilitates 
various important organizational actions such as inter-unit and inter-firm learning, thus 
contributing to their success. Moreover, by building up its social dimension, a firm is able to 
effectively reduce its market-based risk profile (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). For example, 
Waddock and Graves (1997) suggest that stable relations with various stakeholder groups 
facilitate a firm‟s access to equity markets. Improvements in the social facets of CSR also build 
trust in contracting relationships with external stakeholders, thus enabling the firm to lower 
transaction costs (Hill, 1990) and subsequent monitoring and coordination costs (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). Hitt, Lee and Yucel (2002) show that multinational firms engaging in social-
related activities acquire a competitive advantage in the new global marketplace. 
Over the past few years, the environmental dimension of CSR has become quite 
important and more visible. The emergence of various stock market indices (e.g., Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index) listing firms that are perceived to be “green” and the creation of sustainable 
development investment funds are two illustrations of that trend. Environment-related CSR 
reflects how a firm, through its actions or initiatives, is becoming “green”, i.e., with minimal 
ecological impacts (e.g., Feier and Haskell, 2008). Overall, prior research suggests that the value 
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implications from adopting a greening strategy are generally positive, albeit with some context-
specific conditions or aspects (see, among others, Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).  
2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure 
In an attempt to be transparent and accountable toward their stakeholders, many 
organizations now issue CSR reports or disclose extensive information about CSR issues in their 
annual report or in a complementary report. The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) provides a 
broad-based framework for the development of CSR disclosure strategies, with guidance on 
report content, the type of indicators to be selected or the CSR facets (environmental, human 
rights, etc.) to be discussed (http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework). There is 
extensive literature that reviews and synthesizes CSR reporting by organizations, most 
specifically its characteristics as well as determinants (e.g., Gelb and Strawser, 2001).  
However, the relevance and credibility of a firm‟s overall CSR disclosure can still be 
questioned. For example, there is considerable potential for problems when stakeholders 
perceive that a firm is just engaging in a public relations exercise and cannot demonstrate 
concrete action that leads to real social and environmental benefits. In that regard, Gray and 
Bebbington (2007) highlight that a relatively small proportion of firms that are listed worldwide 
provide CSR disclosure. Moreover, they argue that, even among those firms showcasing their 
CSR activities, the average quality of disclosure is so uneven as to be useless for meaningful 
analyses and comparisons.  
In addition, the impact of a firm‟s social disclosure on information asymmetry between 
managers and investors can only be effective if the firm‟s social capital traits are visible and 
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salient in the market, for example through social performance reputation ratings (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). In this vein, a corporate disclosure policy is important in supporting the lasting 
effects of its social capital on market-based risk and performance measures. In that regard, 
Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2009) show that social disclosure reduces a firm‟s cost of equity 
capital. With respect to environmental disclosure, Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2008) find that it 
is associated with a decrease in analysts' forecast dispersion both in continental Europe and in 
North America. 
Moreover, it is likely that the mapping between CSR disclosure and its appreciation by 
capital market participants is more subtle than just assuming that more is better. Findings from 
two studies provide tentative frameworks to consider the issue. On the one hand, Neu, Warsame 
and Pedwell (1998) treat social disclosure as a determinant of environmental disclosure. The 
authors argue that social disclosure enhances environmental disclosure credibility by 
constructing the image of socially responsible organizations harmonizing with environmental 
disclosure. On the other hand, Godfrey et al. (2008) find that a firm‟s participation in 
institutional CSR activities (i.e., that benefit society at large) provide an insurance-like benefit 
when it faces legal/regulatory actions. In other words, these CSR activities help build up capital 
for the firm and minimize negative market implications, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry for investors for these specific firms. Both findings suggest that CSR disclosure may 
affect the level of information asymmetry between a firm and investors through an interaction 
between social-related CSR disclosure and environmental-related CSR disclosure. This view 
contrasts with the current practice of considering both as complementary.  
2.4 Hypotheses 
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There is anecdotal and empirical evidence that both social disclosure (e.g. Downing, 
1997; Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan, 2009; Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux and Magnan, 2009; 
Richardson and Welker, 2001) and environmental disclosure (e.g. Cormier, Magnan and Morard, 
1993; Barth and McNichols, 1994; Li and McConomy, 1999; Aerts, Cormier and Magnan, 2008) 
affect investors‟ appreciation of a firm‟s underlying risk. For example, Cormier, Ledoux and 
Magnan (2009) show that web-based social disclosure is associated with a larger earnings 
multiple, i.e. a lower cost of capital. However, in the absence of empirical evidence to the effect 
that social and environmental disclosures substitute or complement each other in reducing 
information asymmetry between managers and investors, our research attempts to test the 
following alternative hypotheses: 
 
H1a: There is a substitution effect between social and environmental disclosures in 
reducing information asymmetry.  
 
H1b: There is a complementary effect between social and environmental disclosures in 
reducing information asymmetry. 
  
Cho and Patten (2007) argue that the legitimizing nature of different types of 
environmental disclosures is not identical and that it is important to distinguish between different 
types of information when assessing legitimization effects. They primarily distinguish between 
litigation related and non-litigation related disclosure. This dichotomous split of disclosure types 
resembles the distinction made by Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari (2008) between soft and 
hard environmental disclosures, with hard disclosures reflecting factual, objective information 
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that cannot easily be mimicked by poor environmental performers. Finally, Aerts and Cormier 
(2009) show that soft environmental disclosure is more incentive-consistent than hard 
(economic-based) disclosure. Economic-based types of information focus on the financial, legal 
and operational consequences of corporate environmental activities. 
We anticipate the relation between environmental disclosure and share price volatility to 
be higher for hard disclosure than for soft disclosure.  Hence, the following hypothesis, which 
holds irrespective if the relation between social and environmental CSR disclosures are substitute 
or complementary: 
 
H2: The reduction in information asymmetry is higher for hard environmental disclosure 
than for soft environmental disclosure. 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Sample 
The sample comprises 137 observations of web disclosure for the year 2005. We initially 
collected web disclosure in the summer of 2002 for an international study (XXX, 2007). All non-
financial firms represented on the Toronto Stock Exchange S&P/TSX Index were identified (the 
total index comprises 220 firms in the summer of 2002). The resulting 2002 sample comprised 
189 non-financial firms. Mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcies and delistings reduced our 
sample to 157 in 2005. The final sample comprises 137 firms since, out of the initial sample of 
157 firms, there are missing data for board size and board independence, and share volatility. 
Sample firms represent more than 80% of the Toronto Stock Exchange capitalization for non-
financial firms and 46% of total capitalization. Sample firms operate in the following industries: 
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Metals and mines; Gold and precious metals; Oil and gas; Paper and forest products; Consumer 
products; Industrial products; Real estate; Utilities; Communication and media; Merchandising. 
Financial data was collected from the Stock Guide and data about governance attributes was 
collected from 2004 proxy statements, those available in the spring of 2005. 
 
3.2 Empirical Model 
This study attempts to provide an integrated analysis of a firm‟s social and environmental 
disclosure strategy. We posit that this strategy simultaneously affects information asymmetry and 
disclosure. Based on prior literature, we use share price volatility as a proxy for information 
asymmetry. The following simultaneous equations model summarizes the approach adopted in 
the empirical analysis (we will use share price in place of share price volatility as a sensitivity 
analysis): 
 
Dependent variable 
Share price volatility it =   
(0 + 1 Systematic risk + 2 Free float + 3 Analyst following + 4 Environmental 
disclosure + 5 Environmental disclosure*Social disclosure median + 6 Social disclosure 
+ 7 Social disclosure* Environmental disclosure median) it 
 
Instrumented variable: Environmental disclosure, Social disclosure 
Instruments: Environmental performance, Free float,  Analyst following, Leverage, Profitability, 
Firm Size, Board independence, Board size, Board size squared, Audit committee size, 
Environmental news exposure.   
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Several approaches to assess a firm's information asymmetry coexist. Francis, Khurana 
and Pereira (2005), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Healy Hutton and Palepu (1999) and Welker 
(1995) show that the extent of information asymmetry – proxied by bid-ask spread, share price 
volatility or stock liquidity (trading volume) – is negatively associated with disclosure. In the 
current study, we will use share price volatility and trading volume to assess the relation between 
information asymmetry and social and environmental disclosures. 
Environmental disclosure is measured using a coding instrument in a manner similar to 
Wiseman (1982), Cormier and Magnan (2003), Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes (2004) and 
Aerts and Cormier (2009). The grid comprises 39 items measuring environmental disclosure 
quality where the items are grouped into six categories as follows:  
Expenditures and risk;  
Laws and regulations;  
Pollution abatement;  
Sustainable development;  
Land remediation; and 
Environmental management.  
 
The rating is based on a score from one to three. Three points are awarded for an item 
described in monetary or quantitative terms, two are awarded when an item is described 
specifically, and one is awarded for an item discussed in general. The information is coded 
according to the grid presented in appendix 1. 
We believe that the use of a coding scale to qualify a firm‟s environmental disclosure is 
appropriate for the following reasons. First, it allows for some integration of different types of 
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information into a single figure that is comparable among firms in terms of relevance. Second, 
while other disclosure studies rely on word counts to measure environmental disclosure (e.g., 
Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998; Williams and Ho Wern Pei, 1999), a qualitative scale allows 
the researcher‟s judgment to be utilized in rating the value or quality of the disclosures made by 
a firm. While this process is more subjective, it ensures that irrelevant or redundant generalities 
are not considered strategic environmental disclosures. 
We collected social and environmental disclosure from firms‟ web pages including 
annual reports, environmental/sustainability reports and information directly presented on web 
sites in HTML format. We then eliminated any overlap between these three communication 
media. The grid comprises 16 items measuring social disclosure where the items are grouped 
into three categories as follows: Labour practices and decent work, Society, Consumer and 
product responsibility.  
Social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social 
trust that facilitate co-operation for mutual advantage (Industry Canada, 2008). Social disclosure 
items relate to interactions between the firm and society (e.g., alliances, clients) and within the 
firm itself (e.g. Dess and Shaw, 2001; Pastoriza, Arino and Ricart, 2008). Social indicators are 
based on balance scorecard literature and performance measurement practices (e.g. Pirchegger 
and Wagenhofer, 1999; Marston and Polei, 2004). We measure social disclosure using a coding 
instrument that is consistent with Wiseman (1982), Cormier and Magnan (2003), Aerts, Cormier 
and Magnan (2007) and Cormier, Ledoux and Magnan (2009). Like the environmental disclosure 
grid, three points are awarded for an item described in monetary or quantitative terms, two are 
awarded when an item is described specifically, and one is awarded for an item discussed in 
general (see appendix 1). 
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To ensure consistency across firms, two persons reviewed all individual scores 
independently. All disagreements were subsequently reviewed by one of the co-researchers.
1
 
Concerning the environmental news exposure, we searched for articles related to 
environmental issues contained in the ABI/Inform Global database using the keywords 
mentioned above. A total of 59 relevant stories were identified for 2004 (See appendix 2 for 
details). 
For the data regarding governance attributes, we rely on 2004 proxy statements since we 
collected governance disclosure web sites during the spring of 2005, i.e. in line with information 
available from the more recent proxy statement available at that time, namely 2004. Share price 
volatility is defined as the standard deviation of percentage changes in daily stock prices for 
2005.  
 
 
3.2.1 Determinants of Share Price Volatility  
Prior studies on the determinants of information asymmetry between managers and 
investors suggest numerous determinants other than voluntary disclosure (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). Based on that literature, we use systematic risk, free float and analyst following as 
determinants of share price volatility. 
                                                 
1 A coding manual documenting coding instructions as well as standardized coding worksheets were prepared 
beforehand. Each coder then applied the following coding sequence: (1) independent identification of the occurrence 
of items relative to the different coding categories; (2) independent coding of the items according to quality level of 
content and (3) timed reconciliation on a subset of company reports. The coders were intensively trained in applying 
coding instructions and in using the coding worksheets. They were unaware of the research hypotheses. Initial 
differences in identifying grid items accounted for, on average, 7% of the maximum number of items identified. Of 
the information quality level coding, less than 10% had to be discussed for reconciliation. Disagreement between 
coders mostly occurred at the beginning of the coding process (essentially the first 5 firms by industry). A researcher 
reconciled coding disagreements exceeding 5% of the highest total score between the two coders. Smaller 
disagreements were resolved by the two coders themselves. Overall, we think that this coding process provides a 
reliable measure of environmental reporting. Internal consistency estimates (Cronbach's alpha on score components) 
show that the variance is quite systematic (from alpha 0.72 for environmental disclosure-Press releases to 0.82 for 
paper-based environmental disclosure). 
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Systematic risk.  The higher a firm‟s systematic risk, the more difficult it is for investors 
to precisely assess a firm‟s value and the more likely they are expected to incur information costs 
to assess its risk drivers. Prior research shows that investors charge a higher cost of equity for 
firms with higher systematic risk (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2005; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004; Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001; 
and Botosan, 1997). A positive relation is expected between systematic risk and share price 
volatility. 
Free float. We use free float as an inverse proxy for the presence of insiders since control 
blocks have generally superior access to private information (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  
Hence, we expect a negative association between free float and share price volatility. 
Analyst following. Prior studies (Atiase and Bamber, 1994; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; 
Marquardt and Wiedman, 1998) argued that analyst following proxies for a firm‟s information 
that is publicly available. More specifically, Roulstone (2003) documents results that are 
consistent with analysts reducing information asymmetry by providing public information to 
market participants, while there is no support for analyst following functioning as a proxy for 
privately held information. A firm‟s analyst following is often used as a proxy for the level of 
other disclosures and the extent of a firm‟ communication with financial analysts (Leuz, 2003). 
Hence, we expect a negative relation between analyst following and share price volatility. 
Environmental and social disclosures. To test our substitution hypothesis, we use two 
interaction terms: (1) Environmental disclosure in interaction with a binary variable, Social 
disclosure greater than the sample median, and (2) Social disclosure with a binary variable, 
Environmental disclosure greater than the sample median.  
Three variables are introduced to capture the impact of corporate governance attributes as 
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a monitoring factor: Board independence; Board size; and Audit committee.  
Board independence. We expect board independence, measured as the proportion of 
outside directors, to be associated with share price volatility. Another aspect of board 
independence is the separation of the roles of Chair and Chief Executive Officer. Rechner and 
Dalton (1991) show that an independent leadership structure, in which two different persons are 
posted as Chair and CEO, monitors the top management effectively. Our variable takes the value 
of zero (0) when the majority of directors are not independent, one (1) when the majority of 
directors are independent and two (2) when the majority of directors are independent and the 
functions of CEO and Chair of the board are separate. We expect a negative relationship between 
this variable and share price volatility.  
Board size. Some prior studies (e.g. Golden and Zajac, 2001; Vafeas, 1999) assume the 
relationship between board size and information asymmetry to be an inverted “U” shape, with an 
optimal board size existing midway. Below this optimal or the most efficient board size, there is 
a positive relation between board size and information asymmetry followed by a negative 
relationship. To account for the possible non-linear relationship between board size and 
information asymmetry, we will include board size as well as board size squared in our models. 
Hence, we expect board size to be negatively associated with share price volatility. 
 Audit committee size. In Canada, audit committees must comprise at least three 
independent members. We can argue that three is a small number for the audit committee to 
effectively play its monitoring role and that adding a few more members could be beneficial in 
that regard. Hence, we expect audit committee size to be negatively associated with share price 
volatility. 
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3.2.2 Determinants of Social and Environmental Disclosure 
Environmental performance. Many authors examine the association between 
environmental disclosure and a firm‟s environmental performance. Results are mixed. Ingram 
and Frasier (1980), Jaggi and Freedman (1982), Wiseman (1982), Rockness (1985), Freedman 
and Wasley (1990), and Fekrat, Inclan and Petroni (1996) do not find a significant association 
between environmental disclosure (in the annual report or in the 10K report) and the CEP index 
of environmental performance while Patten (2002a) establishes a negative relationship. Some 
recent works document a positive association between environmental performance and the extent 
of discretionary environmental disclosures (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and Vasvari, 2008; Al-
Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes II, 2004). According to Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen and Hughes 
(2004), a positive relationship conjectures that prior literature‟s mixed results describing their 
interrelations may be attributable to the fact that researchers have not jointly considered 
Environmental disclosure, Environmental performance, and Economic performance. Legitimacy 
theory predicts a negative association between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure. This relationship suggests that environmental disclosure is a function of social and 
political pressures facing firms (Aerts and Cormier, 2009). Environmental performance is 
computed by summing Canada‟s National Polluting Release Inventory (NPRI) of all facilities for 
an individual company in pounds deflated by $1,000 of sales (Clarkson, Li, Richardson and 
Vasvari, 2008; Aerts and Cormier, 2009). To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we 
reverse the sign of this variable. In other words, the larger this measure is, the better the 
environmental performance. Consistent with prior studies on legitimacy theory (e.g. Patten, 
2002a; Aerts and Cormier, 2009), we expect a negative relation between CSR disclosure and 
environmental performance.  
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Free float. Ownership structure can determine the level of monitoring and, thereby, the 
extent of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Firms with widely held ownership are expected to be 
responsive to public investors‟ information costs since no dominant shareholders typically have 
access to the information they need (Hope, 2003; Roe, 2003). Therefore, a positive relation is 
expected between free float and disclosure. 
Analyst following. Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) find 
a positive relation between analyst following and the quality of a firm‟s disclosure. Hence, we 
expect a positive relationship between analyst following and the extent of disclosure. 
Leverage. Roberts (1992), Richardson and Welker (2001) and Elijido-Ten (2004) do not 
find any significant relationship between leverage and social disclosure while Clarkson, Li, 
Richardson and Vasvari (2008) find a positive relationship between leverage and environmental 
disclosure based on Global Reporting Initiative Guidelines. Conversely, Cormier and Magnan 
(2003) document a negative relationship between leverage and environmental disclosure.
2
 Since 
the actual impact of leverage on environmental disclosure is unclear, no directional predictions 
are made for the variable. 
Profitability. Many studies document a positive association between a firm‟s level of 
disclosure and its financial performance (Mills and Gardner, 1984; Cochran and Wood, 1984; 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis, 1988; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). Firms with superior 
earnings performance have a higher propensity to reveal their “good news”. Hence, Murray, 
Sinclair, Power and Gray (2006) document that firms with consistently higher returns tend to 
                                                 
 
2 
An explanation for the inverse relationship (positive association for social disclosure and negative association for 
environmental disclosure) could be that social disclosure is more likely to be good news than environmental 
disclosure. 
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have higher levels of total and voluntary social and environmental disclosure. In this vein, we 
expect a positive relationship between profitability and environmental disclosure.  
Firm Size. Prior evidence is consistent in showing a positive relation between the extent 
of corporate disclosure and firm size (Scott, 1994; Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998). Firm size 
also proxies other factors, such as the extent of monitoring by analysts. Firm size, measured as 
ln(Assets), is introduced with an expectation of a positive relation with disclosure. 
Governance and media monitoring. Three variables are introduced to capture the impact 
of corporate governance as a monitoring factor affecting governance disclosure: Board 
independence; Board size; and Audit committee size. We expect a positive relationship between 
board effectiveness and disclosure. As for board size, to control for non-linearity in the 
relationship between board size and disclosure, we will include board size and board size 
squared in our models. Hence, we expect board size to be positively related to disclosure. 
Environmental news exposure. A number of studies document that higher levels of media 
exposure relative to environmental issues increase public concerns and thus public policy 
pressure, to which companies react through greater environmental disclosure (Brown and 
Deegan, 1998; Deegan, Rankin and Voght, 2000; Patten, 2002b; Li, Richardson and Thornton, 
1997; Bewley and Li, 2000). Hence, a positive relationship is expected between environmental 
media coverage and environmental disclosure as well as social disclosure.  
3.2.3 Variable measurement 
Variable Measure 
Systematic risk Beta  
Free float The percentage of shares that are not closely held 
(total shares outstanding minus control blocks of 10% 
or more). 
Analyst following Number of analysts following a firm. 
Leverage Long-term debt / Total assets 
Profitability Return on assets 
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Firm size  Ln(Total Assets) as of year-end 
Board independence (0) if a majority of directors are not independent; (1) if 
a majority of directors are independent; (2) if a 
majority of directors are independent and if the 
functions of CEO and Chair of the board are 
separated. 
Board size Number of directors on the board. 
Audit committee size Number of audit committee members. 
Environmental performance Toxic release inventory (TRI) of all facilities for an 
individual company in pounds deflated by $1,000 of 
sales. 
Environmental news exposure Articles related to environmental issues in 2004. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about sample firms‟ financial and governance 
variables. Sample firms are relatively large (total assets averaging $5 billion) and followed by 
seven analysts on average. About 78% of sample firms are free float. Systematic risk is close to 
the stock market risk, averaging 1.10, suggesting that our sample is a good representation of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange. Our sample firms have independent directors in a proportion of 36%, 
with 20% CEO and board chair duality.  
[Insert table 1] 
 
As illustrated in Table 2A, environmental disclosure score averages 27.76 (median of 10) 
while the social disclosure score shows a mean score of 18 (median of 11). Internal consistency 
estimates (Cronbach's alpha on score components) show that the variance is quite systematic 
(alpha varying from 0.77 to 0.82 for different components). This is slightly higher than Botosan 
(1997), who finds an alpha of 0.64 for an index including five categories of disclosure in annual 
reports. Cronbach's alpha estimates the proportion of variance in the test scores that can be 
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attributed to true score variance. It can range from 0 (if no variance is consistent) to 1.00 (if all 
variances are consistent). According to Nunnaly (1978), a score of 0.70 is acceptable.  
In table 2B, we observe that environmental management component shows the highest 
score (7.21) followed by Pollution abatement (6.88). Finally, among social disclosure 
components, the highest mean scores are observed for Society (9.89) and Labour practices and 
decent work (5.89).   
[Insert table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents correlations. Environmental disclosure (-0.13), Social disclosure (-0.21), 
Board size (-0.36), Profitability (-0.45) and Firm size (-0.46) are negatively and significantly 
correlated with Share price volatility. Environmental performance is correlated with 
Environmental disclosure (-0.33) and Social disclosure (-0.32), indicating that poor 
environmental performers are inclined to communicate more environmental information. This 
result is consistent with prior research arguing that environmental disclosure is a function of 
social and political pressures facing firms (Patten, 2002a). Environmental news exposure is 
positively associated with Environmental disclosure (0.39) and Social disclosure (0.38). Finally, 
Social disclosure is correlated with Environmental disclosure (0.54).  
[Insert table 3] 
4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
First, we present results from an OLS regression on the determinants of environmental 
and social disclosures. We observe from table 4 that environmental performance, environmental 
news exposure and firm size are key drivers of disclosure. To a lesser extent, leverage and board 
size are related to environmental disclosure.  
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[Insert table 4] 
 
Since we posit that a firm‟s information dynamics affect environmental disclosure, social 
disclosure and share price volatility simultaneously, we first assess whether or not interaction 
exists between these variables using a Hausman test. Using this procedure, we reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity with respect to Share price volatility and Environmental disclosure 
(t = 3.49; p < 0.00) as well as Social disclosure (t = 4.19; p < 0.00). Therefore, environmental 
disclosure variables are treated as endogeneous variables. In light of this diagnostic, we rely on a 
two-stage estimation procedure for a system of simultaneous equations. The software being used 
is STATA.  
Table 5 reports results of a two-stage least square estimation. First, we discuss results for 
total disclosure. Consistent with the substitution hypothesis (H1a), the coefficient for the 
interaction term Social*Environmental median (0.269; p < 0.05) is positive and significant, 
suggesting a substitution or compensating effect between social disclosure and environmental 
disclosure in reducing stock market asymmetry. Results show a negative and significant 
relationship between Share price volatility and the extent of social disclosure (0.320; p < 0.05). 
This result suggests that environmental disclosure and social disclosure might be part of an 
integrated reporting strategy by market participants. The compensating effect between 
environmental and social disclosures is particularly observed for hard environmental disclosure 
(economic-based) with the coefficient on Environmental*Social median (0.184; p < 0.10) also 
significant. Overall, CSR disclosure seems to reach a maximum in term of reducing share price 
volatility.         
 [Insert table 5] 
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Economic-based environmental disclosure, so-called hard disclosure, is mainly comprised 
within the following four components of our content grid: expenditure and risk; compliance with 
laws and regulations; pollution abatement; and land remediation and contamination, whereas soft 
information relates to the „sustainable development‟ and „environmental management‟ grid 
captions. Disclosure about sustainable development and environmental management is likely to 
be more discretionary, less factual and objective, and easier to imitate even without substance to 
support the claims made. We estimate our model distinguishing between for hard and soft 
disclosures.  
Results presented in table 5 also shows that only hard environmental disclosure is 
associated with a reduction in asymmetry between managers and investors (-0.212; p < 0.10). 
This result is consistent with our hypothesis 2, i.e. the reduction in share price volatility is higher 
for hard environmental disclosure than for soft environmental disclosure. Furthermore, this result 
is confirmed when combining in the same regression hard and soft environmental disclosure 
variables and computing a Student t-test for coefficient equality between environmental hard and 
environmental soft (coefficient for hard disclosure minus coefficient for soft disclosure = 0). We 
observe an absence of equality between both coefficients (t=0.54; p < 0.463). 
In addition, results suggest that for soft environmental disclosure, the substitution effect 
of environmental disclosure only operates for high environmental disclosure scores. We also 
observe that for high disclosing firms (both social and environmental), social disclosure has a 
larger impact in reducing share price volatility than environmental disclosure.  
As a first sensitivity analysis, we estimate our model distinguishing between social 
component scores (Labour practices, Society, Consumer and product responsibility) and focusing 
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on environmental hard disclosure. Results presented in table 6 show that disclosure about Society 
(-0.270; p < 0.018 one-tailed), and Labour practices (-0.741; p < 0.026 one-tailed) are associated 
with a reduction in share price volatility while the substitution effect with hard environmental 
disclosure remains. As for Consumer and product responsibility disclosure, we observe a 
marginal impact on share price volatility (-0.880; p < 0.125 one-tailed). The substitution effect of 
Customer and product responsibility disclosure with hard environmental disclosure is also 
marginal (0.808; p < 0.254 two-tailed). This result should be interpreted cautiously because the 
disclosure score of Consumer and product responsibility (2.22) is low compared with Society 
(9.89) and Labour (5.89). Hence, we think that it is appropriate to rely on total social disclosure 
in assessing the relationship between environmental disclosure and social disclosure. 
[Insert table 6] 
 
As a second sensitivity analysis, we replace share price volatility by share price. The 
model is the following: 
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Dependent variable 
Share price it =   
(0 + 1 Book value per share + 2 Environmental disclosure + 3 Environmental 
disclosure*Social median + 4 Social disclosure + 5 Social disclosure* Environmental 
median) it 
 
Instrumented variable: Environmental disclosure, Social disclosure 
Instruments: Book value per share, Environmental performance, Free float,  Analyst following, 
Leverage, Profitability, Firm Size, Board independence, Board size, Board size squared, Audit 
committee size, Environmental news exposure    
Results shown in table 7 are in line with those presented in table 5. Consistent with the 
substitution hypothesis (H1a), the interaction term Social disclosure*Environmental median (-
2.192; p < 0.05) is negative and significant, suggesting a substitution effect between social 
disclosure and environmental disclosure in stock price valuation. Again, the compensating effect 
is especially observed for hard environmental disclosure. Results also suggest that for soft 
environmental disclosure, the substitution effect only operates for high environmental disclosure 
scores. Results also show that only hard environmental disclosure is associated with stock price 
valuation. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 2. 
[Insert table 7] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Most prior research on corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure has considered 
environmental and social components as additive or complementary. In this paper, we explore 
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the substitution or compensating effect between social disclosure and environmental disclosure 
in reducing information asymmetry between managers and investors.  
Our results show that social disclosure and environmental disclosure substitute each other 
in reducing stock market asymmetry, especially for hard environmental disclosure.  
Two approaches coexist in the measurement of CSR disclosure. On the one hand, starting 
with Wiseman (1982) and continuing with Cormier and Magnan (2003), Aerts and Cormier 
(2008) and Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari (2008), disclosure is achieved by coding the nature 
of the information being provided. In other words, the information being disclosed is weighted 
according to its perceived relevance. On the other hand, there is a considerable body of research 
in which content is inferred by counting the number of words or sentences contained in annual or 
social responsibility reports (e.g., Neu et al., 1998; Richardson and Welker, 2001). Our results 
strongly indicate that investors assess the nature of the information being provided and 
distinguish more words from more substantive disclosures (e.g., hard disclosure vs. soft 
disclosure). In addition, future research in CSR disclosure may fruitfully distinguish between 
social and environmental disclosure as well as communication devices. 
Regarding the determinants of environmental disclosure, our results show that 
environmental performance, environmental news exposure, leverage, and firm size are key 
drivers of CSR disclosure. More specifically, we find that a firm‟s environmental performance 
directly affects its CSR disclosure, with high polluting firms disclosing more than low polluting 
firms. This result is in stark contrast with the evidence by Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari 
(2008) that poor (good) environmental performance translates into less (more) disclosure. Our 
finding corroborates prior research that relies on legitimacy theory (Cho and Patten, 2007; Aerts 
and Cormier, 2009). Hence, the issue is still unresolved and warrants further research.  
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We also document that a firm‟s governance influences the extent of its CSR disclosure 
and, ultimately, affects information asymmetry between managers and investors. These findings 
are consistent with those reported by Bushman, Chen, Engel and Smith (2003) for the 
determination of financial reporting. 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the substitution effect of 
social disclosure for environmental disclosure, taking into account social disclosure, 
environmental performance and governance attributes.  
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution at least for three reasons. 
First, our measure of social and environmental disclosures is based upon a coding instrument that 
makes some explicit assumptions about the value and relevance of information. However, such 
an approach is consistent with recent research efforts (e.g., Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari, 
2008). Second, sample size may be an issue. However, sample firms do represent a wide cross-
section of Canada‟s industries as well as a significant proportion of the country‟s total stock 
market capitalization. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Financial and governance variables  
 
N: 137 Min. Max. Mean Standard  
deviation 
Share price volatility 0.818 8.828 2.135 1.228 
Systematic risk -0.200 2.800 1.101 0.577 
Free float 0.098 1.000 0.777 0.225 
Analyst following 0 35 7 5.892 
Board independence 
  Independent directors 
  Board chair duality  
0 
0 
0 
2 
0.860 
1 
0.919 
0.360 
0.200 
0.513 
0.178 
0.401 
Board size 4 18 10 2.718 
Audit committee size 3 9 4 1.106 
Leverage 0 0.99 0.232 0.203 
Profitability -1.151 0.387 0.025 0.139 
Firm size (in millions of $) 25 39 000 5 057 7 389 
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Table 2A 
Descriptive statistics 
Environmental and social disclosures   
 
N: 137 Min. Max. Mean Median Standard  
Deviation 
Cronbach 
Alpha 
Environmental news 
exposure 
0 6 0.366 0 0.944 -- 
Environmental performance 0 25.78 0.735 0 2.530 -- 
Environmental disclosure  0 134 27.765 10 35.608 0.82 
Social  disclosure  0 97 18.003 11 18.000 0.77 
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Table 2B 
Descriptive statistics 
Environmental and social disclosures by components 
 
N: 137 Environmental  Social   
 Mean  Mean  
Expenditures and risks 2.919  
Laws and regulations conformity 1.899  
Pollution abatement 6.879  
Sustainable development 4.006  
Land remediation and contamination 4.852  
Environmental management 7.208  
   
Labour practices and decent work  5.892 
Society  9.891 
Consumer and product responsibility  2.216 
Total 27.765 18.003 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Share price  volatility 
 
1 *0.29 0.03 -0.08 *-0.13 *-0.21 -0.02 *-0.36 -0.31 -0.01 -0.07 *-0.45 *-0.46 -0.10 
2 Systematic risk 
 
 1 *0.19 *0.24 0.08 *0.15 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 *-0.14 0.10 *0.13 -0.01 
3 Free float 
 
  1 *0.12 0.04 0.05 0.14 -0.08 0.05 0.01 *-0.30 -0.03 -0.06 0.01 
4 Analyst following 
 
   1 0.02 *0.18 -0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.02 *-0.29 0.10 *0.14 *0.13 
5 Environmental disclosure 
 
    1 *0.54 -0.01 *0.22 *0.20 *-0.33 0.02 *0.15 *0.49 *0.39 
6 Social  disclosure 
 
     1 -0.02 *0.30 *0.33 *-0.32 0.03 *0.17 *0.54 *0.38 
7 Board independence 
 
      1 0.09 0.07 -0.02 *-0.14 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 
8 Board size 
 
       1 *0.55 *-0.13 *0.17 *0.16 *0.54 0.08 
9 Audit committee size 
 
        1 *-0.18 0.11 *0.19 *0.38 0.07 
10 Environmental performance 
 
         1 0.07 -0.07 *-0.22 -0.09 
11 Leverage 
 
          1 0.07 *0.29 0.01 
12 Profitability 
 
           1 *0.29 0.07 
13 Firm size 
 
            1 *0.23 
14 Environmental news 
exposure 
             1 
Note: *: p < 0.10. 
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Table 4 
OLS Estimation of the Determinants of 
Environmental and social Disclosure 
 
 Predicted 
sign 
Environmental disclosure  Social disclosure  
Environmental performance - ***-2.478 ***-1.266 
Information costs and benefits    
Free float + 6.739 *5.601 
Analyst following ? ***-0.996 0.191 
Leverage ? *-24.812 -7.350 
Profitability + -4.576 -5.926 
Firm size + ***10.301 ***4.553 
Governance and media monitoring    
Board independence + 0.607 0.659 
Board size + ***14.906 **4.163 
Board size squared - ***-0.748 **-0.197 
Audit committee size + 2.289 **2.611 
Environmental news exposure + ***10.479 ***4.711 
Adjusted R
2
 
F statistic (P value) 
 42.46% 
9.18(0.000) 
43.107% 
13.1(0.00) 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 5 
2SLS Estimation of the Relationship between  
Environmental and Social Disclosures and Share Price Volatility 
 
  Share price volatility 
  Environmental  
Total 
 
Environmental  
Hard 
Environmental 
Soft   
 
Share price volatility     
Systematic risk + **0.906 *0.553 ***0.902 
Free float - 0.666 1.058 0.400 
Analyst following - -0.012 -0.018 -0.023 
Environmental  - -0.123 *-0.212 -0.115 
Environmental*Social median ? 0.103 *0.184 0.085  
Social - **-0.320 ***-0.291 ***-0.217 
Social*Environmental median ? **0.269 **0.236 ***0.183 
Adjusted R
2
 
F (P value) 
 41.05% 
6.46(0.00) 
42.05% 
6.52(0.00) 
40.16% 
6.30(0.00) 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Instrumented variable: Environmental disclosure, Social disclosure 
Instruments: Environmental performance, Free float,  Analyst following, Leverage, Profitability, Firm Size, Board 
independence, Board size, Board size squared, Audit committee size, Environmental news exposure.   
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Table 6 
2SLS Estimation of the Relationship between  
Hard Environmental disclosure, Social Disclosures and Share Price Volatility 
 
  Share price volatility 
  Labour Society Consumer and 
product 
Share price volatility     
Systematic risk + **0.775 **0.578 ***0.909 
Free float - 0.778 0.362 0.806 
Analyst following - -0.010 -0.018 **-0.060 
Environmental  - **-0.145 **-0.127 **-0.065 
Environmental*Social median ? *0.119 **0.106 **0.049 
Social - **-0.741 **-0.271 -0.880 
Social*Environmental median ? **0.639 **0.215 0.808 
Adjusted R
2
 
F (P value) 
 36.70% 
4.05(0.00) 
41.03% 
6.28(0.00) 
35.24% 
6.46(0.00) 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Instrumented variable: Environmental disclosure, Social disclosure 
Instruments: Environmental performance, Free float,  Analyst following, Leverage, Profitability, Firm Size, Board 
independence, Board size, Board size squared, Audit committee size, Environmental news exposure.   
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Table 7 
2SLS Estimation of the Relationship between  
Environmental and Social Disclosures and Share Price 
 
 Share Price 
  Environmental  
Total 
 
Environmental  
Hard 
Environmental 
Soft   
 
Book value per share + ***1.061 **0.911 ***1.107 
Environmental  + 1.253 *2.441 1.613 
Environmental*Social median ? -1.089 *-2.068 -1.432 
Social + **2.192 **2.574 **1.723 
Social*Environmental median ? *-1.943 **-2.319 **-1.537 
Adjusted R
2
 
Chi2 (P value) 
 45.32% 
7.27(0.00) 
38.51% 
7.36(0.00) 
45.01% 
8.66(0.00) 
*: p < 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.One-tailed if there is a predicted sign, two-tailed otherwise. 
 
Instrumented variable: Environmental disclosure, Social disclosure 
Instruments: Book value per share, Environmental performance, Free float,  Analyst following, Leverage, 
Profitability, Firm Size, Board independence, Board size, Board size squared, Audit committee size, Environmental 
news exposure    
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Appendix 1 
Environmental disclosure grid 
 
Expenditures and risks   Sustainable development 
Investments    Natural resource conservation 
Operation costs   Recycling 
Future investments   Life cycle information 
Future operating costs   Land remediation and contamination 
Financing for investments   Sites 
Environmental debts   Efforts of remediation 
Risk provisions   Potential liability- remediation 
Risk litigation   Implicit liability 
Provision for future expenditures   Spills (number, nature, efforts of reduction) 
Laws and regulations 
conformity 
  Environmental management 
Litigation, actual and potential   Environmental policies or company concern for the environment 
Fines   Environmental management system 
Orders to conform   Environmental auditing 
Corrective action   Goals and targets 
Incidents   Awards   
Future legislation and regulations   Department, group, service affected to the environment 
Pollution abatement   ISO 14000 
Emission of pollutants   Involvement of the firm in the development of environmental standards 
Discharges   Involvement in environmental organizations (industry committees, etc) 
Waste management   Joint projects with other firms providing environmental management services 
Installation and process controls    
Compliance status of facilities    
Noise and odours    
Rating scale: 
3: Item described in monetary or quantitative terms; 2: Item described specifically; 1: Item discussed in general 
 
Social  disclosure grid 
Labour practices and decent work 
Employment opportunities 
Labour rights / Job creation 
Equity programs 
Human capital development / training 
Accidents at work 
Health and safety programs  
Social activities 
 
Society 
Regional development  
Gifts and sponsorships  
Business ethics / measures anti-corruption 
Strategic alliances  
Community involvement  
 
Consumer and product responsibility 
Purchases of goods and services 
Product-related incidents  
Product development and environment 
Consumer heath and safety /Product safety  
Rating scale: 
3: Item described in monetary or quantitative terms; 2: Item described specifically; 1: Item discussed in general 
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Appendix 2 
News media content 
 
News media content is extracted from the ABI/Inform Global database and from three distinct sources:  
(1) Business, Economics: local and regional business publications (local and regional business news 
coverage of large corporations, privately held companies, local start-ups, executive profiles, marketing, 
finance, and industry news. ABI Inform provides access to business information not typically found in 
national news sources. It contains news and analysis, information on local markets, and more data 
gathered from major business tabloids, magazines, daily newspapers, wire services, and city, state, and 
regional business publications;  
(2) Business, Finance, Economics: journals, company profiles, Wall Street Journal (most scholarly and 
comprehensive way to explore and understand business research topics. It includes nearly 1,800 
worldwide business periodicals for in-depth coverage of business and economic conditions, management 
techniques, theory, and business practices, advertising, marketing, economics, human resources, finance, 
taxation, computers, and more. It constitutes extensive international coverage with quick access to 
information on more than 60,000 companies with business and executive profiles);  
(3) Canadian Newsstand, which offers unparalleled access to the full text of Canadian newspapers 
(Montreal Gazette, National Post and Toronto Star). We extracted articles using a firm‟s name and the 
following keywords: “environment”, “sustainable development”, “recycling”, “pollution”, “toxic”, 
“ISO14000”, “conservation”, “remediation”, “spills”, “waste management”, “energy”, “awards”, 
“environmental audit”.   
 
 
